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Dana Berliner
Most rape victims know their attackers.' Yet convicting rapists of such
nonstranger rapes is particularly difficult.2 When a woman3 is raped by a
stranger who jumps out of the proverbial dark alley, courts and jurors tend to
assume lack of consent. In acquaintance rapes, however, lack of consent is
difficult to prove. Empirical studies indicate that when the victim4 and defen-
dant are not strangers, prosecutors are less likely to prosecute and juries less
likely to convict than in stranger rapes.5 As the relationship between defendant
and victim becomes closer, there is a greater tendency to presume consent.6
Given that juries and courts are likely to believe that a victim consented in
cases where Lhe victim and defendant knew each other previously or were
"voluntary social companions"7 at the time of the rape, it is not surprising that
1. Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An Empirical Study,
55 WASH. L. REv. 543, 588-89 (1980) (68 percent); Sorenson, Stein, Siegel, Golding & Burnam, The
Prevalence of Adult Sexual Assault: The Los Angeles Epidemiologic Catchment Area Project, 126 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1154, 1160 (1987) (81 percent); cf. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTmIIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1987, at 44-45 (1989) (46 percent).
2. When most people think of rape, they think of a "traditional" rape, one in which the rapist is a
stranger to the victim, assaults her with a weapon, and may also steal her money after the rape. However,
women are more likely to be raped by nonstrangers. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. In a
"nontraditional" rape, the defendant and victim have known each other before the rape, and the defendant
uses less (or less obvious) force. After analyzing a number of studies, Susan Estrich concludes that tradi-
tional stranger rape is probably one of the most reported crimes and has high conviction rates. In contrast,
nonstranger rapes are one of the least reported crimes, with high attrition rates at all stages of reporting and
prosecution. Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1161 (1986).
3. Because most rapes are committed by men against women, this Note will use pronouns accordingly.
Most of the Note's discussion is applicable to any sexual assault involving adults.
4. As used in this Note, the word "victim" designates the complaining witness in the case. It does not
represent a conclusion about the accuracy of the rape accusations.
5. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-54 (1966) (juries look at voluntary associa-
tion of victim with defendant as "assumption of risk"); Lafree, Variables Affecting Guilty Pleas and
Convictions in Rape Cases: Toward a Social Theory of Rape Processing, 58 SOC. FORCES 833, 848 (1980)
(guilty pleas and convictions less likely when victim and defendant acquaintances); Lafree, Reskin & Visher,
Jurors' Responses to Victims' Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual Assault Trials, 32 Soc. PROBLEMS 392,
400 (1985) (jurors less likely to convict when victim and defendant acquaintances). For reviews of empirical
research, see L. BOURQUE, DEFINING RAPE 199-200 (1989) and Estrich, supra note 2, at 1171-78.
6. Catharine MacKinnon argues that intimacy with the defendant and presumption of consent are
inversely related. Thus, there is often a presumption of nonconsent in stranger rapes, but in marital rapes
there seems to be an irrebuttable presumption of consent. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and
the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 648-49 (1983).
7. A number of states recognize a voluntary social companion exception, which reduces the degree
of felony of the rape. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 773 to 775 (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, §§ 252 to 253 (1983); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1985).
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defendants in these cases often raise the defense that they truly and reasonably
believed that the victim consented to sexual activity.8 This defense is called
"reasonable belief of consent" or "reasonable mistake of fact as to consent". I
On its face, the reasonable mistake defense seems eminently "reasonable,"
in the common meaning of the term. If a man could not have reasonably known
that a woman did not consent to sexual activity, he should not be held liable
for rape. In practice, however, the reasonable mistake defense is misunderstood
and misused. This Note will argue that if our judicial system rethinks the
policies underlying the defense, and accordingly adjusts its application, the
defense could become a valuable tool in determining culpability for rape.
Part I of this Note describes the basic legal elements of rape. Part II de-
scribes the defense of reasonable belief as to victim consent. It then explains
how courts have misapplied the defense of reasonable belief of consent by (1)
effectively failing to examine whether the defendant genuinely believed his
victim consented and (2) creating a standard of reasonableness which makes
a belief of consent reasonable only if the victim failed to physically resist. After
comparing the standard of reasonableness used in rape cases with that used in
cases of self-defense killings, Part II concludes that the reasonableness standard
applied to rape defendants is much less "reasonable" than the standard applied
to homicide defendants. Part III suggests that courts and prosecutors look at
the reasonable belief of consent defense with a more critical eye. Jury instruc-
tions and prosecutors should focus the jury's attention on deciding whether the
defendant actually believed the victim was consenting. Part III also proposes
a rebuttable presumption of nonconsent in cases where the victim shows
nonconsent by arguing with the defendant, physically struggling, or crying.
I. A RAPE LAW PRIMER: THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF REASONABLE MISTAKE
This part presents an overview of basic legal doctrines of rape, including
the elements of the crime and possible defenses to the charge. To facilitate an
understanding of rape law as it currently exists, this part also presents the
history of the legal treatment of victim physical resistance.
8. The issue of mistake of fact of consent arises in nearly every presenting case in which the defendant
and victim knew each other. Telephone interview with Penny Schneider, Los Angeles County Deputy
District Attorney (Sept. 12, 1989); Telephone interview with Darcy McGraw, former Manhattan Assistant
District Attorney (Oct. 19, 1989).
9. Reasonable belief and reasonable mistake of consent are slightly different defenses. A defendant's
reasonable belief of consent may be consistent with actual consent, while a reasonable mistake implies that
the victim did not consent. Since the distinction is not important to this Note, the terms will be used
interchangeably.
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Reasonable Belief of Consent
A. The Elements of Rape
To obtain a rape conviction, the prosecution must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt certain elements of the crime. Specifically, it must prove to the jury
that there was sexual activity, that the victim did not consent to this activity,
that the defendant used force or threat of force as a means to the sexual activi-
ty, and that the defendant intended to rape the victim.
1. Lack of Consent
Lack of consent is often believed to be the essential element of rape, 0
because sexual activity with the consent of a woman is never rape.1 In most
states, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had sexual intercourse
without the consent or against the will of the victim. 2 Few states statutorily
define consent, but those that do describe it as words or actions indicating a
"freely given agreement,"' 13 a definition similar to the popular understanding
of consent. 4 But in rape law, courts have not interpreted "without consent"
to mean the absence of what is popularly understood to be "consent;"' 5 the
prosecution must do more than prove that the victim did affirmatively consent.
To establish "without consent," it must prove actual refusal; mere absence of
consent or silence will usually be insufficient for conviction.' 6
2. Force
In a rape case, the prosecution must prove that the defendant used force or
threat of force against the victim. 17 Like "lack of consent" and "consent,"
10. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 715 (1946); Director of Pub. -f-osecutions v.
Morgan, 1976 App. Cas. 182,214 (H.L. 1975); Estrich, supra note 2, at 1121; Comment, Rape Reform and
a Statutory Consent Defense, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1518, 1519 (1983).
11. In contrast, sexual activity without the consent of a woman may not be considered rape if the
defendant did not exercise force. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-60 to -61 (1982); CAL. PENAL. CODE §§ 261(2), (6) to (7) (West
1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 22(b) (Vest 1990); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (Consol. 1984).
In some states, nonconsent is not an element of the crime, but consent is available as a defense. See infra
note 43.
13. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 200.366(1) (Michie 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4)
(West 1982).
14. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 482 (1986) defines consent as "capable,
deliberate, and voluntary agreement to or concurrence in some action .... However, the popular under-
standing of consent to sex may more closely resemble the legal standard or absence of resistance. See L.
BOURQUE, supra note 5, at 265-67 (1989).
15. See Bienen, Rape Il--National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 170, 181, 183-84 (1980) (discussing entrenchment of common law consent doctrine).
16. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1126, 1132.
17. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70 (West 1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.3(2) (1988).
Other states use the concept of"forcible compulsion," instead of force. See, e.g. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-
61 (1982); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040(I)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
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courts and legislatures have rarely, if ever, defined the terms "force" or "threat
of force" within the context of rape law."8 Statutes do not establish an amount
of physical coercion sufficient to demonstrate that sexual activity was accom-
plished "by force."' 9 Furthermore, because courts and the general public21
seem to believe that a certain amount of force is normal in sexual activity, it
becomes difficult to determine what behavior constitutes force.
The legal meaning of threat of force is similarly amorphous. While courts
have consistently held threat of force to include threats with a weapon,' less
obvious threats may not be held to meet the statutory requirement. Courts have
found intimidating behavior by the defendant to constitute an implicit threat of
force when the victim and defendant are strangers,' but not when the victim
voluntarily associated with the defendant.'
3. Intent
In general, a defendant cannot be convicted for a crime, including rape, if
he did not have the requisite intent or mens rea to do the forbidden act.'
Criminal intent can be described in terms of one of four levels of mental
§ 9A.44.040 (West 1988). Forcible compulsion is sometimes defined as force overcoming resistance. See
infra note 36. Also, a number of states create a lesser penalty for nonconsensual sexual activity where the
defendant does not use force. For a review of these states, see Searles & Berger, The Current Status of Rape
Reform Legislation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 25, 32 (1987) (Table 3).
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (Michie 1986).
18. Use of a forcible compulsion standard obviates the need for a definition of force; force is whatever
is necessary to overcome resistance. The definition problem thus shifts to defining sufficient resistance. See
Estrich, supra note 2, at 1105-06.
19. Obvious examples of physical violence like beating the victim will often, but by no means always,
be thought by juries to constitute "force." See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1105-06, 1131-32.
20. Courts have held that force does not include the physical contact necessary to accomplish a sexual
act upon a passive victim. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 403, 312 S.E.2d 470, 473 (1984)
(undressing and forcing legs apart); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 529, 534-35, 365 S.E.2d 237,
240 (1988) (fondling of fourteen year old feigning sleep). Estrich describes this as the force "incidental"
to a sexual act. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1107-09 (discussing case law).
21. While people generally understand the act of rape to entail some use of force, there can be
substantial force before people are willing to identify an act as "rape." See L. BoURQUE, supra note 5, at
135-41, 265-74.
22. See, e.g., State v. Longabardi, 5 Conn. App. 424,426,499 A.2d 79,80 (1985) (defendant threatened
victim with gun); Shelby v. State, 541 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (same).
23. See, e.g., People v. La Salle, 103 Cal. App. 3d 139, 142, 162 Cal. Rptr. 816, 821 (1980) (implicit
threat found where defendant induced victim into car by refusing to return her two-and-one-half year old
child); People v. Dorsey, 104 Misc. 2d 963, 970, 429 N.Y.S.2d 828, 832 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (large young
defendant trapping small older woman in an elevator between floors constituted implicit threat).
24. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1115-16 & nn.75-76. See, e.g., State v. Lester, 70 N.C. App. 757,761,
321 S.E.2d 166, 168 (1984), aff'd, 313 N.C. 595, 330 S.E.2d 205 (1985) (per curiam) (father of victim
frequently beat her mother and became angry at victim's refusal); People v. Evans, 85 Misc. 2d 1088, 1096,
379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 918-19 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 858, 390 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1976) (defendant
suggested, hypothetically, that he might hurt or kill victim).
25. Crime is a union of a voluntary act and a particular state of mental culpability. W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.1 (2d ed. 1986). See. e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1988); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 15.10 (Consol. 1984); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 to .02 (1985).
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culpability: intention, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.' The theoretical
importance of the mens rea doctrine, however, has little impact on a rape case
because the defendant's intent is rarely the primary focus of rape trials.27 Only
a few jurisdictions indicate which level of intent suffices for a rape convic-
tion.' Most states simply fail to discuss levels of intent in rape cases.2 9 As
the next section demonstrates, the defendant's intent and actions are not used
to assess his culpability. Instead, the law looks to the victim's actions and asks
whether she properly demonstrated nonconsent. 0
B. Victim Resistance-The Ghost Element of Rape
Historically, victim physical resistance was an element which had to be
proven to convict a defendant of rape.31 Rape law has thus traditionally em-
phasized the victim's actions-namely her physical resistance or lack there-
of-by using her actions as evidence of her lack of consent, the defendant's
use of force,32 and his intent.3 3 If the victim vigorously resisted, this meant
26.
A person acts intentionally.., when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to
engage in such conduct ....
A person acts knowingly... when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that
such circumstance exists ....
A person acts recklessly... when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk .... The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof
constitutes agross deviation from the standard of conduct that areasonable person would observe
in the situation ....
A person acts with criminal negligence. . . when he fails to perceive a substantial and
unjustifiable risk .... The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe
in the situation ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (Consol. 1984). Every state uses nearly identical language. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1-501 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010 (1988); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02 (1985).
The primary difference between recklessness and negligence is that a reckless person has consciously
considered a risk and disregarded it, while a negligent person has not consciously realized a risk although
a reasonable person would have. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 4 (1985).
27. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1096-99. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 210 Conn. 132, 136-38, 554 A.2d
713, 715-16 (1989) (rejecting intent as "touchstone" of rape); State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291, 1295-96 (Me.
1984) (intent not an issue in rape trial).
28. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3402 (1986) (knowingly); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.115(2),
163.375 (1989) (negligently); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (Vernon 1989) (knowingly). Judicial
decision has established the standard in Missouri to be recklessness. State v. Koonce, 731 S.W.2d 431,437
n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
29. See. e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 34, 252 (statutes require intent as an element of sexual
assault); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 462, 463 (intent not mentioned for first or second degree rape);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 15.15(2), 130.35 (Consol. 1984).
30. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1098-1100; Comment, supra note 10, at 1535-36.
31. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMNAL LAW 211 (3d ed. 1982) (role of resistance in establishing
rape); Estrich, supra note 2, at 1122-23 (describing history of resistance requirement).
32. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 31, at 211 (resistance used to establish both nonconsent
and force); Bienen, supra note 15, at 182 (same); Estrich, supra note 2, at 1129-30 (same).
33. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1099 (defendant continuing in face of physical resistance shows intent
to rape).
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that she did not consent, that the defendant needed to use force to overcome
her resistance, and that her resistance informed him of her lack of consent so
that when he forced her, he must have intended to rape her. On the other hand,
courts have interpreted submission or lack of resistance to mean that the victim
consented and that the defendant did not force her.34
Elimination of the physical resistance requirement has been one of the most
important goals of rape law reform,35 and, at least in terms of statutory reform,
this goal has largely been achieved. The majority of states have repealed the
statutory requirement of physical resistance,36 realizing that victims are often
too frightened to resist37 and that victims who resist are often more seriously
injured than those who submit." Most have eliminated the requirement simply
by omitting any reference to resistance in their definition of force,39 while a
few states have enacted explicit provisions stating that physical resistance is
not a required element of rape.n"
In practice, statutory revision has not had the intended effect of eliminating
the need for victim physical resistance. Although no longer explicitly required,
it nevertheless remains an unacknowledged yardstick for courts when evaluating
evidence of force and consent. 1 Moreover, a victim's lack of resistance is still
evaluated and often considered to be a crucial factor in a rape case where the
defendant asserts the defense of reasonable belief of consent.
34. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 194 Cal. App. 3d 525, 529, 530, 239 Cal. Rptr. 569, 571, 572 (1987)
(consent may be manifested by acquiescence or even some resistance if this is a relationship pattern).
35. Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777,
799 (1988).
36. The requirements that the victim resist to the "utmost" and "continuously" until penetration have
now been universally repealed. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1123-24; Note, Recent Statutory Developments
in the Definition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L. REV. 1500, 1506 (1975). Most states have also eliminated
all requirements of victim physical resistance. See infra notes 40 & 83.
However, those states which use "forcible compulsion" as an element of rape usually define it in terms
of force or threats that overcome resistance. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(8) (1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3121 (Purdon Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(5) (1988).
37. See, e.g., R. WARSHAV, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 54-56, 60-62 (1988); Estrich, supra note 2, at
1111.
38. See People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 299-302, 721 P.2d 110, 118-21, 228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 237-39
(1986) (reviewing research data); M. AMIR, PATrERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 169-71 (1971) (correlation
between victim resistance and degree of force used by attacker); cf. L. BOURQUE, supra note 5, at 53-54
(critically reviewing research on prevalence and effects of resistance).
39. See, e.g., statutes cited infra note 83.
40. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520i (West Supp. 1990).
41. For extensive discussion of the continuing role of resistance, see Estrich, supra note 2, at 1095-1134
and Comment, supra note 10, at 1531-46. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 409, 312 S.E.2d 470,
476 (1984) (conviction reversed because victim's lack of resistance was insufficient to establish force or
threat of force); see also State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 247-59, 424 A.2d 720, 728-35 (1981) (Cole, J., dis-
senting) (dissenting judge enraged by conviction when victim failed to resist).
2692
1991] Reasonable Belief of Consent 2693
II. THE DEFENSE OF REASONABLE BELIEF OF VICTIM CONSENT
The two most common defenses to rape charges in acquaintance rape cases
are consent and reasonable belief of consent.42 A consent defense43 often
entails the claim that the victim's behavior, as she herself described it, constitut-
ed consent 4 This type of consent defense is thus similar to, and sometimes
indistinguishable from, the reasonable belief of consent defense, which asserts
that the victim's behavior would have looked like consent to the reasonable
man.
The reasonable belief of consent defense contains two elements, one subjec-
tive and the other objective. First, at the time of the sexual conduct, the defend-
ant must have honestly believed the victim consented. Second, the defendant's
belief must have been reasonable.45
42. Defendants may also assert other defenses that are beyond the scope of this Note. Examples include
alibi, lack of sexual activity, lack of force, or mistaken identification of the defendant.
43. where lack of consent is a statutory element of the crime of rape, a defendant will be acquitted
if the prosecution does not carry its burden of proving nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Some states have eliminated lack of consent as an element of the crime butprovide that victim consent
is a defense. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. §
2C:2-10 (West 1982). However, in most of these states, the prosecution must prove lack of consent beyond
a reasonable doubt once the defendant has raised the issue of consent. See, e.g., People v. Haywood, 118
Ill. 2d 263, 274,515 N.E.2d 45, 50 (1987); People v. Thompson, 117 Mich. App. 522,528-29,324 N.W.2d
22,24-25 (1982); see also Comment, supra note 10, at 1548, 1554 (advocating shifting from lack of consent
as element of crime to consent as defense to crime).
Washington is the only state that shifts the burden of proof of a consent defense to the defendant. See
State v. Camara, 113 Wash. 2d 631, 638-40, 781 P.2d 483, 487 (1989); see also Note, Focusing on the
Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 399,
414 (1988) (advocating burden shift to defendant). However, since the prosecution must still prove forcible
compulsion, this change has had little effect in Washington. Telephone interview with Michael Hogan, King
County Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (March 21, 1991).
44. DeferJants argue and judges often agree that lack of resistance means the victim consented. See,
e.g., State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 255, 424 A.2d 720,733 (1981) (Cole, J., dissenting) ("She may not simply
say, 'I was really scared,' and thereby transform consent or mere unwillingness into submission by force.").
Judge Cole implies that the victim's lack of resistance constituted consent. See also People v. Burnham,
176 Cal. App. 3d 1134, 1144-45, 222 Cal. Rptr. 630, 638-39 (1986) (consent defense may involve assertion
that victim's observable behavior indicated consent).
There are two other possible claims which may be involved in a consent defense. The defendant may
claim that the victim actually consented to the sexual activity and subsequently lied about the events in
question. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 171 Cal. App. 3d 1149, 1156, 215 Cal. Rptr. 634, 638 (1985) ("The
defense of consent ... might only involve the contention that the complaining witness lied about the events
that took place.. . ."); see also People v. Burnham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1134, 1141, 222 Cal. Rptr. 630, 638
(1986) (defendant raising consent defense often refers to out-of-court victim statements indicating consent).
A second related claim is that the woman actually desired the forceful activity even if she offered some
resistance or gave signs of nonconsent. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 302-03 (1980); Note,
Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62
YALE L.J. 55, 67-68 (1952).
45. In California and Missouri, the elements of the defense were established by judicial interpretation
of a general statutory mistake defense. See People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 155, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345,
125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 753 (1975); SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL, No. 10.65 (1988) [hereinafter CALJIC]; State v. Williams, 696 S.W.2d 809,
811-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). Courts have created the defense in other states. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 210
Conn. 132, 141-42,554 A.2d 713,717 (1989); People v. Crispo, No. 3105-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1988).
Alaska also permits a defense of honest but reckless mistakes of fact. Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621,
627-28 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). For an evaluation of this defense, see Comment, Culpable Mistakes in Rape:
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A. Flawed Application of Honest Belief
Generally, mistake is a defense to a crime when the factual mistake makes
the requisite criminal intent impossible. 6 To satisfy the first doctrinal element
of the reasonable belief defense, then, a defendant must claim that he did not
have the requisite mens rea for the crime of rape because he genuinely and
honestly believed the victim was consenting. If he believed, even mistakenly,
that the victim was consenting, then he merely intended to have consensual
sexual intercourse and had no criminal intent at all.47
In practice, this "subjective" aspect of the defense (i.e., did the defendant
honestly believe the victim consented) is virtually ignored. Because defendants
are entitled to raise the reasonable belief defense without testifying, juries
evaluate the defendant's reasonable belief defense without hearing him testify
that he in fact believed the victim consented." Moreover, when the defendant
does not testify, a jury may be instructed on the reasonable belief defense if
the victim's testimony about her own behavior suggests the possibility of rea-
sonable mistake.49 Thus, the courts focus on the victim's behavior, not the
defendant's subjective belief that the victim consented.
The subjective prong of the defense is further discounted because, in prac-
tice, the courts have improperly collapsed the two elements. That is, instead
of determining whether a particular defendant honestly believed his victim
consented 0 and then whether that belief was reasonable, courts ask whether
any defendant could have reasonably believed the victim consented.5 Under
this approach, the court no longer conducts a particularized inquiry into the
beliefs and behavior of the defendant but instead hypothesizes that his belief
Eliminating the Defense of Unreasonable Mistake of Fact as to Victim Consent, 89 DICK. L. REV. 473
(1985).
46. For example, if a person believes the wallet she picks up is hers, she does not have the requisite
criminal intent for this act to constitute theft.
The criminal code of nearly every state contains a similar section regarding mistake of fact: "A person
shall not be relieved of criminal liability for conduct... unless: (1) such factual mistake negates the mental
state required for the commission of an offense ... " CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-6(a)(1) (West 1985);
see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 4-8(a) (Smith-Hurd 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT § 562.031(1) (Vernon
1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-4(a)(1) (Vest 1982); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(l)(a) (1985).
47. See People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 155,542 P.2d 1337, 1345, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745,753 (1975).
48. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 144 Cal. App. 3d 55, 62, 192 Cal. Rptr. 409, 413 (193) (reversible
error in not giving reasonable belief instruction although defendant did not testify). A defendant may not
be compelled to testify in order to raise a defense. But see Bienen, Mistakes, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 224, 238-
240 (1978) (honest belief should not be evaluated without defendant testimony).
49. See, e.g., People v. Castillo, 193 Cal. App. 3d 119, 126, 238 Cal. Rptr. 207, 211 (1987) (victim's
testimony alone demonstrated equivocal conduct).
50. Estrich, supra note 2, at 1117-18, advocates such a particularized inquiry.
51. See, e.g., People v. May, 213 Cal. App. 3d 118, 126,261 Cal. Rptr. 502,506 (1989) (victim's self-
described behavior "could reasonably have been misinterpreted"); People v. Romero, 171 Cal. App. 3d 1149,
1156, 215 Cal. Rptr. 634, 638 (1985) (jury must ask whether victim's actions "reasonably could be
misunderstood by defendant"); State v. Smith, 210 Conn. 132, 141, 554 A.2d 713, 717 (1989) (asks if
victim's conduct "should reasonably be viewed as indicating consent").
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was honest if it could have been reasonable.5 2 Once a court or jury finds that
belief of consent was reasonable (the second prong), it then automatically has
found that a defendant could have reasonably and honestly held such a be-
lief-implying that he did, in fact, hold such a belief.53 Hence the first prong
becomes superfluous.
If the courts do not enforce the subjective element, the defense becomes
more available and more subject to manipulation; a defendant who did not
honestly believe the victim consented may nevertheless successfully employ
the defense if "hypothetically" someone else might have reasonably believed
consent was given.
B. Flawed Application of Reasonable Mistake
Due to the flawed inquiry into the honesty of the defendant's belief, the
inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendant's belief of consent becomes
the central issue in a reasonable mistake defense. The next problem is that
courts and juries believe that a defendant's belief of consent is reasonable when
the victim does not resist.
1. Reasonable Belief as a Proxy for the Resistance Requirement
The elimination of the physical resistance requirement has intensified fears
that innocent men will be convicted of rape.' These fears are embodied in
two separate but related beliefs: (1) that men will be convicted solely on the
basis of a woman's subjective feelings of violation, even if she behaved as if
she were consenting,5 and (2) that a reasonable man will assume consent in
the absence of physical resistance. In theory, the reasonable belief defense was
created to guard against feared miscarriages of justice that could result from
miscommunication. In practice, the defense has become a proxy for the physical
resistance requirement, with its attendant drawbacks.
The first belief focuses upon a problem that has always been evident in rape
law: the divergence between female and male subjective understandings of sex-
ual encounters.56 Some behavior by women (e.g., dress and friendliness) may
52. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1098 ( The perspective that governs is therefore not that of the woman,
nor even of the particular man, but of a judicial system intent upon protecting against unjust convic-
tion .... ").
53. Cf. id. at 1099-1100 (discussing consequences of failure to focus on defendant's intent).
54. Resistance has consistently been represented as a device to prevent unjust convictions. See id. at
1098-99; Note, supra note 36, at 1503-1504; Note, supra note 44, at 68.
55. For an extensive discussion on the fear of this type of unjust conviction, see Taylor, Rape and
IVomen's Credibility: Problems of Recantations and False Accusations Echoed in the Case of Cathleen
Crowell Webb and Gary Dotson, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1987).
56. See Note, Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape, 6 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 147 (1983); see also Estrich, supra note 2, at 1112-15 & n. 66 (discussing differing
interpretations of force in Rusk v. State, 43 Md. App. 476, 406 A.2d 624 (1979), rev'd, 289 Md. 230, 424
A.2d 720 (1981)); MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 654 ("a woman is raped but not by a rapis.").
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be interpreted by men as indicating sexual availability when it is not so intend-
ed.57 Some of women's intended indications of lack of consent are even inter-
preted by men as indicating consent.58 Conversely, women may interpret
men's behavior as threatening when it is not so intended. 9 These problems
of subjectivity and miscommunication call for the application of some sort of
objective test.
The popularity of the physical resistance requirement was, in part, due to
its ability to serve as an objective measure of whether a rape took place, one
so stark that it was not open to misinterpretation by defendants or juries. Thus
it was seen as helping to close the gap between female and male subjective
understandings of sexual encounters.6 0
In the absence of a resistance requirement, courts have looked to objective
manifestations of subjective states or applied a reasonable person standard to
subjective feelings. Both of these approaches evaluate a reasonable belief
defense using an objective standard.6
For example, in a recent ruling, the Supreme Court of Connecticut argued
that courts evaluate lack of consent by reference to objectively measurable
57. See L. BOURQUE, supra note 5, at 134, 140 (reporting results of empirical studies showing that
males infer sexual meaning in dress or behavior of females when it is not so intended).
58. See R. WARSHAW -ipra note 37, at39, 42 (men may ignore clear expressions of nonconsent); Note,
Rape: Reasonableness & 21 ie, 1 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 432, 441 (1981) (men may misinterpret revocation
of consent for sexual interest).
59. Note, supra not. 56, at 147-49 & 150. For this reason, the courts often focus on whether the
victim's fear was "reasonable" when determining whether a rape occurred. See. e.g., People v. Hill, 558
N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (N.Y. App. 1990) ("proper focus is on the state of mind produced in the victim by the
defendant's conduct"); see also Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 696, 437 N.E.2d 224, 232-33
(1982) (where victim's fear explains lack of resistance, such fear must be reasonable).
60. See Note, supra note 56, at 150-51.
61. See People v. Burnham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1143,222 Cal. Rptr. 630,637 (1986) (reasonable-
ness judged by objective standard); Commonwealth v. Cordeiro, 401 Mass. 843, 850, 519 N.E.2d 1328,
1332 (1988) (jury instructed to follow "objective, 'reasonable man"' standard).
The reasonable belief defense has become popular over the last fifteen years, coincident with the decline
of the physical resistance requirement, but it has been used at least as far back as 1888. See, e.g., McQuirk
v. State, 84 Ala. 435, 437, 4 So. 775, 776 (1888). The last case following McQuirk was Gordon v. State,
32 Ala. App. 398, 400, 26 So. 2d 419, 420-21 (Ala. App. 1946). The reasonable mistake defense was
adopted by the military courts in 1954. United States v. Short, 4 C.M.A. 437,445, 16 C.M.R. 11, 19 (1954).
For a review of military law on reasonable mistake, see Wilkins, Mistake of Fact: A Defense to Rape, 14
ARMY LAW., Dec. 1987, at 24. In 1975, the California Supreme Court held that reasonable mistake of fact
constituted a defense to rape, People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 153-58, 542 P.2d 1337, 1344-47, 125
Cal. Rptr. 745, 752-55 (1975), and the English House of Lords ruled that an honest mistake of fact (even
if unreasonable) would constitute a defense, Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Morgan, 1976 App. Cas. 182,
214 (H.L. 1975) (husband told drunken soldiers that his wife's resistance would be insincere). Since then,
a number of states have followed suit. Some do so explicitly. See State v. Smith, 210 Conn. 132, 141, 554
A.2d 713,717 (1989); State v. Beishir, 646 S.W.2d 74,79 (Mo. 1983); People v. Crispo, No. 3105-85 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1988); State v. Faehnrich, 359 N.W.2d 895, 899-900 n.1 (S.D. 1984). Others do so
implicitly by failing to exclude reasonable mistake of consent as a possible defense in future cases. See,
e.g., Green v. State, 611 P.2d 262, 265-66 & n.2 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980). One state court, however, has
ruled that reasonable belief of consent is not a defense to rape. See People v. Hale, 142 Mich. App. 451,
453-54, 370 N.W.2d 382, 383 (1985). Two have reserved the issue. Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass.
682, 697, 437 N.E.2d 224, 233 (1982); Owens v. State, 96 Nev. 880, 884 n.4, 620 P.2d 1236, 1239 n.4
(1980).
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behavior.6 The court specifically held that consent does not refer to the vic-
tim's subjective state but rather to objective manifestations of this state.6 The
court then concluded that a finding of reasonable belief in consent should not
differ from a finding of consent. A person would have a reasonable belief of
consent if there were objective manifestations of consent. But the court still pro-
ceeded to create a separate defense of reasonable belief of consent, reasoning
that the defense was necessary because the defendant might be "concerned
about the possibility" that the jury would look exclusively at the victim's
subjective state.'
Thus, wile both lack of consent and intent have been labeled "subjective,"
representing the victim's 65 and defendant's 66 perspectives respectively, in
practice courts do not treat consent or intent as subjective elements. Courts do
not ask victims and defendants about their subjective beliefs and feelings when
evaluating consent and intent. As in other legal areas, they rely on objective
manifestations of subjective states when evaluating a rape allegation.
The problem with this approach is not that courts rely on an objective
standard, but that courts apply the standard by looking exclusively to the
victim's behavior, particularly her physical resistance or lack thereof. Courts
should evaluate consent by looking to whether the victim behaved as if she
consented 67 and should evaluate intent by looking to whether the defendant
behaved as if he intended to commit a rape. Instead, courts interpret and
evaluate the defendant's behavior in light of the victim's actions.61 If the
victim indicated lack of consent, then the defendant must have had an intent
to rape if he proceeded in the face of her objections. 69 If the victim did not
indicate lack of consent, then he could not have intended to rape her. Thus, the
"objective" evaluation of both lack of consent and intent tends to become an
inquiry into the victim's physical resistance.
Courts have not explicitly recognized the second concern regarding the
conviction of innocent men-that the reasonable man will assume consent in
the absence of physical resistance. Nevertheless, courts tend to accept the
62. State v. Smith, 210 Conn. 132, 554 A.2d 713 (1989).
63. Id. at 140, 554 A.2d at 717 ("Whether a complainant has consented to intercourse depends upon
her manifestations of such consent .... ").
64. Id. at 141, 554 A.2d at 717. The court then engaged in some appellate factfinding to hold that,
given the jury's finding that the victim did not consent, it also implicitly found that the defendant could
not have reasonably believed there was consent. Id.
65. Courts seem to believe that "consent" and "lack of consent" refer to the interior emotional state
of the woman before and during sexual activity. Id. at 140, 554 A.2d at 717. See, e.g. People v. Bruce, 208
Cal. App. 3d 1099, 1104, 256 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (1989); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment
at 428 (1980).
(5- A defendant's intent is subjective almost by definition, since "intent" refers to the defendant's state
of mitiJ. See NV. LAFAVE & A. ScOrr, supra note 25, § 3.1.
67. See, e.g., Johnston v. State, 673 P.2d 844, 847 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1229 (1984); State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 282, 751 P.2d 1165, 1175 (1988).
68. Estrich argues that courts should, but fail to, evaluate defendant's actions as indicating his intent.
See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1117-18.
69. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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reasonable belief of consent defense in cases where the victim did not resist
or submitted after initial resistance.7" Courts' treatment of cases involving
"equivocal conduct"--conduct which was ambiguous as to consent-also
illustrates their continued adherence to the resistance standard. The concept of
equivocal conduct becomes relevant to a reasonable belief defense when the
victim appears ambivalent or submits out of fear, and from this conduct the
defendant claims that he reasonably believed she consented even if the law
would not recognize such submissive behavior as consent. 71
The concept of equivocal conduct was first discussed in People v. M yber-
ry,72 the first major case addressing reasonable belief. In Mayberry, the court
identified the complainant's equivocal conduct as "her 'act' [of having conver-
sation while delaying and looking for an opportunity to escape] and admitted
failure to physically resist him after the initial encounter [digging her nails into
his wrist and stating that she did not want to accompany him] or to attempt to
escape or obtain help. .. ."I This type of conduct, the court held, "might
have misled him as to whether she was consenting." 74 Other examples of
equivocal conduct include willingly accompanying a man to his apartment75
and not attempting to escape from a car at a stop light.76 These cases imply
that equivocal conduct includes both ordinary behavior and the conduct of a
woman who feels herself to be helpless. The defendant may be entitled to jury
instructions on reasonable belief sua sponte if the complainant's testimony in-
70. Most California cases in which the court allowed a reasonable belief defense involved insufficient
or ambiguous victim resistance. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 80-82
and accompanying text (discussing People v. Crispo, No. 3105-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1988)). In at least
one case, the court, after proclaiming the demise of the resistance requirement, stated in a footnote that lack
of resistance is still relevant to reasonable belief. People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 303 n.19, 721 P.2d 110,
121 n.19, 228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 240 n.19 (1986) ("Absence of resistance may also continue to be probative
of whether the accused honestly and reasonably believed he was engaging in consensual sex.").
Conversely, some other courts have refused to entertain a reasonable belief defense in cases where the
defendant used such a high degree of force that resistance could not have been expected. See infra notes
84-86 and accompanying text.
71. See People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 156,542 P.2d 1337, 1346, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745,754 (1975).
There has been considerable debate in California appellate courts about whether a judge must instruct on
reasonable belief of consent if she instructs on consent. People v. Hampton, 118 Cal. App. 3d 324, 329-30,
173 Cal. Rptr. 268, 271-72 (1981) (judge must instruct jury on reasonable belief of consent whenever
consent is defense); cf. People v. Bruce, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1099, 1104,256 Cal. Rptr. 647, 650 (1989) ("One
relying on the Mayberry defense must produce some evidence of the victim's equivocal conduct that led
the accused to reasonably believe that there was consent."); People v. Burnham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1134,
1146-47, 222 Cal. Rptr. 630, 640 (1986) (defendant must produce either evidence of equivocal conduct or
evidence of unequivocal consent).
72. People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745. (1975).
73. Id. at 156, 542 P.2d at 1346, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 754. The defendant testified and denied all aspects
of violence in the complainant's narrative. The court did not conclude that there was reasonable belief, but
only that it was an issue for the jury. Id.
74. Id.
75. People v. May, 213 Cal. App. 3d 118, 125-26, 261 Cal. Rptr. 502, 506 (1989) (victim also failed
to escape when presented with opportunity).
76. People v. Anderson, 144 Cal. App. 3d 55, 62, 192 Cal. Rptr. 409, 413 (1983) (victims were 14
and 15 years old).
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cludes a description of equivocal conduct.77 This understanding of equivocal
conduct implies that if a man may reasonably interpret equivocal, partially
resisting conduct as consent, then a reasonable man can assume consent in the
absence of resistance. "Equivocal conduct" then replaces submission or lack
of resistance in rape law.78 Victims remain in the same double bind as they
were when the resistance requirement was in effect. If they do not resist, they
risk disbelief by the legal system; if they do, they risk being subjected to
greater violence.
79
In one of the few New York cases on this issue, the defense successfully
argued that since sadomasochists customarily evidence some resistance as part
of their sexual activity, the defendant was justified in believing the victim's
resistance was a mere sham. 0 The defendant was acquitted specifically be-
cause the jury could not decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did not reasonably believe that the victim consented." Although the defense
limited its argument to sadomasochism between gay men, there have been
similar theories about women's resistance.82
The courts' effective reinstatement of the resistance requirement via the
defense of reasonable mistake of factS3 is not problematic in violent cases be-
cause most jurisdictions which permit a reasonable mistake of fact defense will
not instruct on it when there is uncontroverted evidence of the application of
significant force 4 or threats with a weapon" or when the defendant admits
force.86 In acquaintance and other nontraditional cases, however, reinstatement
77. People v. Burnham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1134, 1145, 222 Cal. Rptr. 630, 639 (1986).
78. Even the Mayberry court recognized that resistance was at issue in reasonable belief, but it
concluded that it was a consideration that should be addressed by the legislature. People v. Mayberry, 15
Cal. 3d 143, 156, 542 P.2d 1337, 1346, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 754 (1975).
79. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
80. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Atlas, New York Supreme Court Justice (Nov. 2, 1989) (discuss-
ing People v. Crispo, No. 3105-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1988)).
81. Jury members told Justice Atlas that they acquitted on the issue of reasonable mistake. Justice Atlas
volunteered that he believed that the reasonable mistake defense was mandated by New York law, but that
it effectively reinstated the resistance requirement. Id. Unfortunately, it is impossible to obtain systematic
data revealing the number of times juries acquit on the issue of reasonable mistake. This information can
only be found in scattered newspaper interviews or in juror conversations with lawyers and judges.
82. See, e.g., S. FREUD, Femininity, in NEW INTRODUCTORY LECURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 139, 142-
44 (J. Strachey ed. 1989) ("masochism ... is truly feminine"); Note, supra note 44, at 66-68 (resistance
may be inconclusive as to consent because many women require or desire male sexual aggression).
83. None of the jurisdictions which allow a reasonable belief defense have retained a statutory
requirement of resistance or resistance overcome. See CAL PENAL CODE § 261 fVest 1990); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 22 (,Vest 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.030 (Vernon Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.366 (1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00 (Consol. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West
Supp. 1991). Although the legislatures chose to remove this requirement, the courts have unfortunately
chosen to reinstate it through judicial construction of the reasonable belief defense.
84. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 235 Kan. 485, 493-94, 681 P.2d 660, 667 (1984) (defendant struck
victim several times; tape recording corroborated victim's testimony).
85. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 171 Cal. App. 3d 1149, 1153-56, 215 Cal. Rptr. 634, 635-38 (1985)
(threats with sharp object); State v. Lint, 657 S.W.2d 722, 724-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (threats to use and
actual beating with rifle).
86. See, e.g., State v. Faehnrich, 359 N.W.2d 895, 899-901 (S.D. 1984) (defendarit admitting holding
his hand over victim's mouth to stifle screams).
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of the resistance standard is more problematic. First, reasonable mistake seems
most plausible when the defendant does not use obvious physical force,87 since
the victim will not have corroborating evidence of injury. Second, juries are
already disposed toward finding consent simply because the parties know each
other.8" If juries feel some reluctance to completely reject the victim's inter-
pretation, they may be particularly tempted to acquit by the "compromise" of
characterizing the rape as a misunderstanding in which the woman did not
consent, but the defendant reasonably believed that she did. 89
2. Comparing the Degree of Reasonableness in Mistakes of Rape and Self-
Defense
This Note has argued that courts have incorrectly construed what constitutes
a reasonable belief of consent. Comparing the interpretations of reasonableness
in rape law and in self-defense killings reveals that courts have construed
reasonable mistakes of consent more broadly than reasonable mistakes of life
threatening danger. That is, what is considered a "reasonable" mistake in rape
may be relatively unreasonable when compared to what constitutes a "reason-
able" mistake in killing. The underlying purposes for the creation of both de-
fenses suggest that defendants in rape cases should be held to as high a stan-
dard of reasonableness as those in self-defense cases.
Reasonable mistake of fact is permitted as a defense to murder charges. A
defendant's reasonable and honest belief that he was in danger of great bodily
harm or death constitutes the defense of self-defense against a charge of
murder, even if this belief later turns out to be mistaken.90 For a defendant's
belief to be reasonable, it must be neither reckless nor criminally negligent.91
Some jurisdictions have adopted this policy with the defense of consent. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 638
P.2d 1, 4 & n.3 (Colo. 1981) (consent not available as defense to rape by force or threat of force because
"statute prohibits conduct which by its very nature negates the existence of the victim's consent"); State
v. Lint, 657 S.W.2d 722,724 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (defendant threatened victim with deadly weapon); Green
v. State, 611 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (uncontroverted evidence of bruises and torn
clothing); Faehnrich, 359 N.W.2d at 900 (evidence of consent must "utterly negate any element of force,
coercion or threat"). But cf. People v. Thompson, 117 Mich. App. 522, 526, 324 N.W.2d 22, 23 (1982)
(consensual intercourse not necessarily impossible in course of kidnapping).
87. See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV
1, 61-63 (1977) (approving use of reasonable belief defense in such cases); see also People v. Evans, 85
Misc. 2d 1088, 1097-98, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 920-21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), aft'd, 55 A.D.2d 858, 390
N.Y.S.2d 768 (1976) (defendant made ambiguous statement which victim interpreted as threat, but court
held that defendant's meaning controlled).
88. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
89. People v. Bruce, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1099, 1104, 256 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (1989) (characterizing
successful reasonable belief defense as jury conclusion that both parties told truth).
90. The defendant's apprehension of imminent danger and belief in the necessity of deadly force must
be reasonable. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, supra note 25, § 5.7(a)-(c); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§
197(3), 198 (West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19 (fVest 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para.
7-1 (Smith-Hurd 1989); N.Y. PENAL LAv § 35.15 Form 2, para. 2 at 112 (Consol. 1984) (Instruction to
Jury as to Self-Defense).
91. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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The defendant must present some evidence that led him to believe he was in
danger. Honest beliefs which are reckless or negligent constitute imperfect self-
defense and justify conviction on the lesser offense of manslaughter. 2
The existence of a reasonable mistake defense in the context of self-defense
killings can be justified for two related reasons: (1) the consequences of failing
to act may include death, and (2) the defendant has only a very short time to
decide how to react. Indeed, nearly every court discussion of self-defense
emphasizes that using deadly force was necessary.93
Both the risk of death and the time pressure contribute to the necessity of
killing in self-defense. 94 Analogous justifications for the existence of a reason-
able mistake defense in the context of rape are not immediately apparent. The
failure to act in a self-defense situation carries an astronomically greater risk
than the risk of failing to act in a sexual situation. Mistakenly acting in a self-
defense situation, i.e., killing, is also somewhat more costly than mistakenly
acting in a sexual situation, i.e., raping.
Killing based on mistake is partially justified by the exigency of the situa-
tion. The time which could be spent attempting to ascertain whether he is truly
in a life-threatening situation might be a defendant's only opportunity for self-
defense. He must act and must act quickly. In sexual situations, there are
usually no stringent time constraints on his decision and thus no need to make
split-second decisions.95 Moreover, ascertaining the truth about consent in-
volves no risk to the defendant. He could refrain, wait, or ask;96 there is no
need for action. Therefore, the burden on the defendant to reasonably ensure
he is not mistaken about consent in a sexual encounter should be at least the
same as the burden on a defendant to reasonably ensure he is not mistaken that
his life is in danger. Instead, courts have adopted a standard where a man need
not present affirmative evidence of consent, but may reasonably believe that
consent ho,3 been given unless there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary,
92. See NV. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 25, § 5.7(i); see, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 9-2(2)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(b) (Purdon 1983). A few states have held that
an unreasonable belief in the necessity of killing does not mitigate the degree of homicide. See, e.g., State
v. Bowens, 108 NJ. 622, 630-31, 532 A.2d 215, 219 (1987). The MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985)
provides that an unreasonable but genuine belief in the imminence of danger constitutes complete self-
defense, but no states appear to have followed this example.
93. See, e.g., Fersner v. United States, 482 A.2d 387, 393 (D.C. App. 1984); Terry v. State, 467 So.
2d 761, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
94. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1186-89, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172-74 (1989)
(imminence of danger is crucial element of self-defense); People v. White, 87 fI1. App. 3d 321, 323, 409
N.E. 2d 73, 75 (1980) (decision must be made in seconds).
95. Of course, the moment before penetration is a limited period of time. If the woman has consented
up to this point, penetration may be a split-second decision. However, the decision can be delayed in order
to ascertain if the woman is consenting, whereas delay in the decision to exercise deadly force might result
in the person's death.
96. See Balos & Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust. Nonstranger Rape, 75 MINN. L. REv. 599, 607
(1991) (advocating heightened obligation to ensure consent in nonstranger rape); Pickard, Culpable Mistakes
and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the Crime, 30 U. TORONTO L.. 75, 81 (1983) (verbal inquiry is proper
means to avoid mistake); Temkin, The Limits of Reckless Rape, 30 CRIM. L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1983) (same).
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i.e., unless the victim physically resisted.97 Such a standLrd effectively con-
dones reckless and negligent, as well as reasonable, mistakes. In theory,
reckless or negligent mistakes are not bases for acquittal from a charge of rape,
and they should not be allowed to become so through manipulation of the
standard of reasonableness.98
III. RETHINKING THE DEFENSE OF REASONABLE MISTAKE
The doctrine of reasonable mistake of fact as to victim consent has some
major drawbacks. First, courts consistently apply it incorrectly by conflating
the honest belief prong with the reasonable belief prong. Second, by treating
a mistake of consent as reasonable unless there is overwhelming evidence to
the contrary, courts use the reasonable belief defense to effectively reinstate the
resistance requirement. Additionally, the courts' conception of "reasonable"
which informs inquiries into reasonable mistake is not really reasonable when
compared to other areas of criminal law.
One response to these problems would be to simply abolish the defense.
Statutes could define rape as sexual activity in the absence of the victim's
affirmative consent,99 rather than as sexual activity where the victim expresses
refusal. The law could require, in effect, that a man take steps to ensure consent
when faced with any ambiguous signals. In fact, some commentators argue that
the seriousness and overwhelming consequences of rape justify requiring men
to ensure consent. 100
Abolition of the defense in its entirety, however, might generate unwanted
consequences. If one assumes that sincere and reasonable mistakes of consent
are possible, then abolition of the defense might lead to convictions in such
cases. Also, persons must have notice that behavior is criminal in order to
distinguish between criminal and innocent conduct.101 In some circumstances,
a man might not be able to distinguish his honest and truly reasonable belief
from actual consent. Finally, courts may respond to the enhanced fear of
convicting a blameless defendant by simply changing the construction of the
elements of lack of consent and force so both depend on the existence of
97. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
98. It has been suggested that a reckless or negligent rape should give rise to a lesser sentence. See
Estrich, supra note 2, at 1102-03.
99. One case in Wisconsin adopted this approach. See State v. Lederer, 99 Wis. 2d 430, 436, 299
N.W.2d 457, 460 (1980). However, this decision seems to have had no impact on the prosecution of rapes
in Wisconsin. Telephone interview with Donald S. Jackson, Milwaukee County Assistant District Attorney
and Co-Director, Sensitive Crimes Unit (March 12, 1991).
100. See supra Note, supra note 56, at 158-60; note 96 and accompanying text.
101. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926) (criminal statute must not be so
vague that ordinary persons cannot distinguish between criminal and innocent conduct).
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physical resistance.10 2 These negative consequences suggest that the defense
of reasonable belief of consent should be retained.
There is also a positive reason for favoring retention of the defense. If
reformulated, it can become an accurate means of assessing criminal liability
without unfairness to either victim or defendant. In order to accomplish this
goal, jury instructions should be expanded to explain the concepts of "reason-
able" and "honest" belief. 103 The explanation of honest mistake should focus
the jury's attention on the defendant's actions and intent rather than the vict-
im's, and the explanation of reasonable mistake should reflect an appropriate
standard of reasonableness. Additionally, there should be a rebuttable presump-
tion that a belief of consent was not reasonable if the jury finds that the victim
offered verbal resistance, any physical resistance, or cried.
A. Honest Mistake
If a defense of reasonable belief is retained, it becomes important to define
and distinguish what constitutes an "honest" and "reasonable" mistake. lO The
law and the prosecution can and should focus discussion to ask whether the
defendant behaved like a person who believed he was engaged in consensual
sexual activity. A man who believed that a woman desired to engage in sexual
activity with him would not use force, intimidation, or threats of force; they
would not be necessary. Deceptive or threatening behavior is not consistent with
a good faith belief in consent. Admittedly, some proportion of the population
considers such behavior to be part of normal seduction. However, such behavior
reveals an intention to coerce the victim into sexual activity, and law can and
should play a normative role in condemning this behavior.
Because the question of a defendant's genuine belief of consent tends to
be brushed over, the court should instruct (and the prosecutor should urge) the
jury to consider whether the defendant behaved as if he believed the victim
consented. Courts and juries should not treat the honest belief inquiry as a
hypothetical question of whether the defendant might have believed there was
102. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1098 (courts may respond by "defining the crime of rape in a fashion
that is so limited that it would be virtually impossible for any man to be convicted where he was truly
unaware or mistaken as to nonconsent").
103. The current California jury instruction reads, "a reasonable and good faith belief that there was
voluntary consent is a defense ... ," but no detailed explanation of honesty or reasonableness is included.
CAI.IC, supra note 45, No. 10.65.
104. For example, a defendant might admit that he had been physically aggressive and that his victim
had begun to cry but had not fought him. The defendant might then state that he honestly believed that
crying and submission represented consent. A court might address the defendant's belief as an unreasonable
mistake or as so unreasonable as to be dishonest. In Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Morgan, 1976 App.
Cas. 182, 214 (H.L. 1975), the court decided that the defendants' asserted belief of consent was so
unreasonable that they could not have honestly believed it. American courts would probably have treated
this as an unreasonable mistake; English courts have shown a greater interest in the honesty inquiry, but
analysis of honest belief has been mostly obscured by the debate over whether reasonableness or unreason-
ableness is the appropriate standard. See Temkin, supra note 96, for a survey of this debate.
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consent.105 Even without the defendant's testimony, the jury can refer to the
victim's testimony about the defendant's behavior to evaluate if there were
signs of good faith. The court should instruct the jury that such factors as
whether the defendant intentionally used deception, ignored the victim's pro-
tests, attempted to frighten or intimidate the victim, or otherwise attempted to
procure submission by threats argue against a claim of honest belief.
B. Reasonable Mistake
The doctrine of reasonable mistake also calls for an investigation of whether
the defendant could have "reasonably" believed the victim consented. The cur-
rent standard where a man may "reasonably" assume consent in the absence
of resistance 06 is wholly inadequate. 7 Instead, a reasonable mistake should
be defined as one in which (1) the defendant did not use force and (2) the
mistake was not negligent. Furthermore, there should be a rebuttable presump-
tion that a mistake is not reasonable if the victim cried or offered verbal resist-
ance during the encounter.
Any belief of consent by a defendant who has exercised or threatened force
should be deemed categorically unreasonable. Free and voluntary choice is
impossible where coercion is present. When the defendant exercises physical
violence against the victim or threatens her with a weapon, the impossibility
of consent is clear.
Even if one concedes that some women actually do desire forceful or forced
sex, ' it is impossible in the presence of force to distinguish such women
from those who feign consent out of fear. It is improper to err on the side of
legal support for forceful sex at the expense of those who do not desire it. If
state legislatures want to preserve the legality of sadomasochism, an exception
could be created without altering the force of the law. The defendant could be
required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he had ob-
tained explicit consent to forceful sexual activity and (2) he and the victim had
established a procedure for revocation of consent. 09
Consequently, courts should instruct juries to first evaluate whether the
defendant used force. If they find that he did use physical force, then they may
not consider reasonable belief of consent as a defense. If, and only if, they do
105. See supra Section I1.A (describing how honest mistake has been converted to a hypothetical
inquiry).
106. See supra Section II.B.1.
107. Id. The current standard is less reasonable than the standard of reasonable criminal mistake used
in self-defense killing. See supra Section II.B.2.
108. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
109. Interestingly, consent is not a defense to sadomasochistic assault in California, People v. Samuels,
250 Cal. App. 2d 501, 513, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439, 447 (1967), although reasonable belief of consent can be
a defense to a sexual encounter where the victim is injured. See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143,
542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745, (1975).
2704 [Vol. 100: 2687
Reasonable Belief of Consent
not find that he used physical force, they may go on to examine whether his
mistake was reasonable or negligent.
A reasonable mistake should be described as one which is not negligent,
where the fact that this woman might not be consenting would not have oc-
curred to a reasonable man. The current standard of reasonable mistake, al-
though it uses the word "reasonable," effectively condones even reckless mis-
takes by holding that a mistake is reasonable as long as the victim does not
physically resist. Yet, there are many circumstances short of physical resistance
which would lead a reasonable man to wonder about consent. A resistance stan-
dard of mistake presumes that the man cannot hear or speak and can only
observe the woman's large-scale physical gestures. In fact, the man is an active
participant, capable of both comprehending and altering the communication.
Failing to consider the possibility that a woman did not consent when a reason-
able man would have done so should constitute a negligent mistake.110 Juries
should be specifically instructed that physical resistance is not required of the
victim and that submission or lack of resistance does not constitute sufficient
basis for belief of consent.
Women often respond to unwanted sexual aggression by trying to reason
with their attackers, turning cold, physically struggling, and/or crying.'
Courts often hold that such behavior does not meet the statutory requirement
of nonconsent.112 However, this type of victim behavior should have implica-
tions for the reasonable belief defense. Crying or verbal resistance should alert
a reasonable man to the possibility that the woman does not consent. If this
does not alert the defendant, his belief of consent would be negligent. If it does
alert him but he ignores the possibility, his belief of consent would be reckless.
Therefore, there should be a presumption, preferably statutory, that belief of
consent is unreasonable in the face of victim crying, verbal resistance, or any
physical resistance." 3 This presumption should be included in the jury in-
structions.
110. Some courts have expressed discomfort with the concept of convicting someone of rape who was
merely negligent. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cordeiro, 401 Mass. 843,850,519 N.E.2d 1328, 1333 (1988)
(court implies that it would not permit reduction of rape to crime of negligence); Telling, Rape-Consent
and Belief, 47 1. CMrI L. 129, 136 (1983) (conviction improper when defendant held negligent belief of
consent). However, if the law convicts the reckless rapist but not the negligent one, this creates an incentive
for men to discount even the possibility that the woman is not consenting, because once they consider the
possibility, their intent rises to the level of recklessness. See supra note 26 for explanation of difference
between recklessness and negligence.
I11. See Koss, Dinero, Seibel & Cox, Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: Are There Differences in the
Victim's Experience?, 21 PSYCHOLOGY WOMEN Q. 1, 12 (1988) (Table 2). Although most women engage
in some physical struggling, it is likely to be fairly mild and short-lived. See R. WARSHAW, supra note 37,
at 60-62.
112. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1114.
113. Unfortunately, this standard also looks to victim behavior. However, it at least has the benefit
of offering a clear standard. Furthermore, in a case where the defendant does not testify, a victim's testimony
that she engaged in one of these behaviors would create a presumption that the defendant's belief could
not have been reasonable.
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CONCLUSION
Fueled by fears of unjust convictions, the defense in rape of reasonable
mistake as to victim consent has developed into a common law loophole to the
statutory abolition of the resistance requirement. Instead of becoming an inquiry
into a defendant's intent, reasonable belief has become an inquiry into the
victim's resistance. The mistake defense works most powerfully against victims
of acquaintance and date rape, and it contributes to the tremendous difficulty
in obtaining convictions for such rapes.
In order to make the reasonable mistake defense a useful tool for determin-
ing culpability, the honest belief element of reasonable mistake needs to be
revitalized. As a particularized inquiry into whether this defendant could have
believed in good faith that his victim was consenting, the reasonable mistake
doctrine could diminish the necessity of proving outright physical force as an
element of rape.1 14
I do not wish to be unreasonably optimistic. Changes in statutory law seem
to have little effect on outcomes in rape cases.115 Cultural norms regarding
sexual situations are so fraught with confusion that it is often difficult to meet
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard when the victim knows the defendant.
This Note recommends the presentation of different behavioral norms to juries
in the context of the reasonable belief of consent defense.1 16 They may suc-
ceed in some cases and fail in others. By giving substance to the concepts of
"honest" and "reasonable," the law can point out that a belief in consent should
not be a mere assumption. It should have an honest and reasonable basis.
114. Estrich, supra note 2, at 1096-1101.
115. See L. BOURQUE, supra note 5, at 117-30 for a review of empirical research.
116. Many commentators suggest more far-reaching changes in rape law. Some advocate a pure consent
standard (liability where victim fails to consent) or a nonconsent standard (liability where victim objects)
with force acting as an aggravating factor. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1120 & n.96; Ireland, Reform Rape
Legislation: A New Standard of SexualResponsibility, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 185, 196-97 (1978); Comment,
Toward a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 620 (1976); Note, supra note
56, at 158-60. For a review of state statutes which prohibit nonconsensual, nonforceful sexual behavior,
see Searles & Berger, supra note 17, at 32 (Table 3).
Other writers suggest that force and threat of force should establish rape regardless of consent. See,
e.g., S. BROWVNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 384-85 (1975); Berger, supra note
87, at 8 n.50; Estrich, supra note 2, at 1095; Searles & Berger, supra note 17, at 28; Comment, supra note
10, at 1528-29. Estrich suggests a modification of our current system which would include an improved
understanding of both force and nonconsent, as well as an inquiry into mens rea. Estrich, supra note 2, at
1105, 1119-20.
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